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2 
PRELIMINAR.Y STATEM~ENT 
In order to eliminate duplication arising from the filing 
of several briefs and to minimize expense of printng, all 
respondents other than George V. Martin, are joining herein 
in a single brief. 
In this brief the parties will be designated as follows: 
Plantiff and interveners as "the materialmen," George V. 
Martin as "the contractor," Capson-Bowman, Inc., as "the 
owner," and General ·Casualty Company of America as "the 
surety." 
As stated in the brief of appellant, there are no issues 
of fact in this case and, although the record is voluminous, 
the facts are simple. They are substantially summarized 
at page 14! of appellant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
There are but two issues of law in this case, namely: 
l. Are the materialmen entitled to recover the amount 
of their respective claims from the surety? If they are so 
entitled, the owner has complied with the provisions of 
Section 17 -2~1, U. C. A. 1943, and is relieved from liability 
otherwise imposed under Section 17 -·2-21, U .. c. A. 1943-. 
·2. Is the surety entitled to recover over against the 
owner? 
These issues are considered in the argument presented 
by appellant under Points I and II of its brief and will be 
treated in the same order under the same numbered points 
in this brief. 
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POIN11' I 
In order properly to determine the question presented 
under this point, we must examine the provisions of the 
statute, the contract between the owner and the contractor, 
and the bond of the surety. 
The Statute 
The statute is in two sections, set out at pages 211 and 
22 of the brief of appellant. The first section has three 
elements. It prescribes when the bond is required, the con-
ditions of the bond, and the remedy available under it. The 
second section imposes personal liability upon the owner in 
the event of his failure to procure the bond. 
The statute was declared constitutional by this ·Court 
in Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 U. 114, 16!7 P. 241. 
It has been referred to in other cases, but, so far as we are 
able to determine, has not been passed upon by this Court 
in a case such as here presented. 
The legislature in enacting the Statute doubtless con-
cluded that a compelling public policy justified its highly 
penal character, for wholly apart from the protection af-
forded laborers and materialmen under the lien Statute, the 
act imposes upon the owner the duty of procuring the under-
taking of a surety to pay their claims. The owner who fails 
to procure such an undertaking finds himself personally 
bound for the payment of the claims. But having procured 
the promise of the surety the owner is relieved. The 
laborers and materialmen have the promise of either the 
surety or that of the owner for their protection. They 
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cannot, however, have both. The undertaking of the surety 
relieves the owner. ·Thus the test of our problem is found in 
the inquiry as to whether the materialmen enjoy a right of 
action against the surety. This is the nub of this phase of 
the case, and has been so recognized by all parties since the 
action was commenced. 
Counsel for appellant stresses the fact that the statute 
provides that the bond shall run to the owner and all others 
as their interest may appear. We think this not an essential 
element in the case. The heart of a bond is found in its 
conditions. These largely determine and define the obliga-
tions of the surety. If the obligations of the surety are such 
that they extend to others than the obligee named, then the 
right of action flows to such persons as a matter of law. 
The statute provides that the bond shall be conditioned 
upon the faithful performance of the contract and prompt 
payment for material furnished and labor performed under 
the contract. The bond in qqestion here is conditioned upon 
the performance of the contract, which brings us squarely 
to the meat of our problem, namely, whether a bond condi-
tioned only on the performance of the contract will support 
a right of action in favor of a laborer or a materialman, or 
must the bond be conditioned on both the performance of 
the contract and the payment of labor performed and 
materials furnished to support such right of action? Before 
this question can be answered we must examine 
The Contract 
The contract of the parties is in a form issued by the 
American Institute of Architects. 'This form of contract 
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has been considered in many cases. In the case at bar the 
contract documents covering the agreement between the 
owner and the contractor consist of the general conditions 
of the contract, the specifications and the drawings, and the 
agreement. (Article 6 of the agreement.) The specifi-
cations and the drawings are not material to the question 
here presented and were not introduced in evidence. 
The original complaints of the materialmen pleaded 
only certain provisions of the agreement without the gen-
eral conditions of the contract (R. 1-10; 22-61). The de-
murrer of the surety was sustained to these complaints. 
Thereafter the materialmen amended their complaints and 
pleaded both the agreement and the general conditions of 
the contract, attaching copies of the instruments to their 
amended complaints (R. 133-164; 189-275A; 29·9~-304). The 
surety demurred to. the amended complaints, and its de-
murrer was over ruled. Exhibit 1 received in evidence in 
this. case is the agreement with the general conditions of 
the contract attached. From this exhibit it is shown that 
by Article 1 of the agreement the contractor is required to 
furnish all the materials and perform all of the work shown 
on the drawings and described in the specifications and to 
do everything required by the agreement, the general con-
ditions of the contract, the specifications and the drawings. 
Turning to the general conditions of the contract, under 
Article 9 it is provided that unless otherwise stipulated the 
contractor shall provide and pay for all materials, labor, 
water, tools, etc., necessary for the execution and completion 
of the work. There are no contrary stipulations in the con-
tract documents. Article 22 of the general conditions pro-
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vides, among other things, that if the contractor fails to 
make prompt payment to subcontractors or for material or 
labor, the owner, upon the certificate of the architect, may 
terminate the employment of the contractor and take pos-
session of the premises. Turning back to the agreement, in 
Article 5 we find that before issuance of final certificate the 
contractor shall submit evidence satisfactory to the architect 
that all payrolls, material bills and other indebtedness con-
nected with the work have been paid. 
From these provisions it is seen that the contractor 
is under the obligation and duty to erect the structure, but 
this constitutes only a part of his obligations and duties 
under the contract. In addition to the erection of the struc-
ture, he promises promptly to pay for all materials and 
labor necessary for the execution and completion of the 
work. If he does not do so, the owner may terminate the 
contract, and finally the contractor is not entitled to final 
payment under the contract until he submits evidence that 
he has complied with its provisions in the payment for all 
material purchased and labor performed. Thus the contract 
contains an express promise on the part of the contractor 
for the prompt payment for materials furnished and labor 
performed under the contract. 
Where a bond is executed to secure performance of a 
contract, the contract and the bond must be construed to-
gether to determine the extent of the liability of the surety. 
Walker Realty ·Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 
2:11 P. 998. Having found that the contractor promised to 
pay the claims of the materialmen, and the fact being that 
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he failed to do so, to explore further the question of the 
right of the materialmen to proceed against the surety 
we must examine 
The Bond 
The contract is attached to the bond, (Eochibit 3) the 
conditions of the bond are brief but extremely compre-
hensive. They are that 
"* * * if the Principal shall well and truly 
perform and fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, 
terms, conditions, and agreements of said contract 
during the original term of said contract and· any 
extensions thereof that may be granted by the Ob-
ligee, with or without notice to the Surety, and dur-
ing the life of any guarantee required under the 
contract, and shall also well and truly perform and 
fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, con-
ditions and agreements of any and all duly author-
ized modifications of said contract that may here-
after be made, notice of such modifications to the 
Surety being hereby waived, then, this obligation to 
be void ; otherwise to remain in full force and vir-
tue." 
In other words, the bond is conditioned upon the per-
formance of every undertaking, covenant, term, condition 
and agreement of the contract. From our analysis of the 
contract we find that one of its essential undertakings and 
covenants is that the contractor should promptly pay for 
labor performed and material furnished. 
Appellant in its brief at page 20 states that its position 
consistently maintained throughout the proceeding is that 
the bond is conditioned only for the proper completion of the 
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building by the contractor. We agree that the surety has 
consistently so contended, but we urge that in so contending 
the surety is obviously in error. The above quoted plain 
language of the bond is otherwise. 'The contractor, as we 
have pointed out, was clearly obligated to discharge cove-
nants other than for the completion of the building. Par-
ticularly he was obligated to pay for labor a~d materials. 
Assume a case where under a contract such as here 
involved the contractor completed the structure but paid no 
bills for labor and material. The contractor tenders the 
completed building with one hand and with the other 
presents the owner with the unpaid .bills for labor and 
material, which bills the owner, in the absence of a bond, is 
personally obligated to pay. Could it seriously be contended 
that the contractor under such circumstances has per-
formed his contract? How then can it be seriously contended 
here that the contractor, having promised to pay for labor 
and materials and having failed to the extent of the claims 
of the materialmen so to do, has nevertheless performed 
his contract? The owner contracted for a completed build-
ing, it is true, but it did not contract to take a completed 
building and itself be personally bound to discharge the 
contractor's obligation to pay the claims of the material-
men. 
The statute requires that the bond be conditioned upon 
the performance of the contract and prompt payment for 
materials furnished and labor performed. The contract in 
question requires prompt payment for materials furnished 
and labor performed. The bond, conditioned upon the faith .. 
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ful performance of the contract, is accordingly conditioned 
upon the payment for material furnished and labor per-
formed. Under such circumstances is there any need that 
the bond be conditioned upon the performance of the con-
tract and payment for material furnished and labor per-
formed? We think obviously not. ·To add such a further 
condition would only be surplusage. The whole includes 
all of its parts, and if one of the parts of the contract is 
the promise of the contractor to make prompt payment for 
labor performed and materials furnished, nothing can be 
added by conditioning a bond upon performane of the con-
tract and the pa~ent for materials furnished and labor 
performed. Surely the statute does not require that an 
unnecessary or idle provision be set forth in the bond. 
In those instances where the contractor is not bound 
to pay for material furnished or labor performed and there 
is no promise on his part so to do, then, in order to support 
a direct right of action in favor of materialmen or laborers, 
the bond must be conditioned upon the performance of the 
contract and the prompt payment for materials furnished 
and labor performed. But in cases such as here presented 
the addition of the language requiring payment for material 
furnished and labor performed would add nothing whatso-
ever to the bond. The foregoing analysis to us so clearly 
demonstrates the right of the materialmen to sue upon the 
bond in question that further pursuit of the problem seems 
hardly necessary. 
We have not undertaken to consider the principles 
involved in recognition of the rights of third party bene-
ficiaries. These principles have often been considered· by 
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this ·Court in other cases and are so firmly established in the 
law of this jurisdiction that nothing could be gained from 
further exploration in this field of learning. 
We shall, however, briefly review the law as stated by 
authors treating the subject and as announced in the de-
cisions of the courts. 
·General Rule 
The conclusion which we have reached in the analysis 
of the statute, the contract, and the bond in question here 
is fully supported by the great weight of modern authority. 
Appellant has had occasion to refer to the very elaborate an-
notation appearing in 77 A. L. R., page 21. 'This annotation 
deals with various phases of the right of materialmen and 
laborers to bring an action directly upon the bond of a 
contractor. Our precise problem is considered at page 62, 
where the annotator announces the rule to be that: 
"According to the majority view that laborers 
and materialmen may recover on a building con-
tractor''s bond conditioned for their payment, it is 
generally held that they are entitled to avail them-
selves of a bond conditioned merely for the faithful 
performance of the contract, and containing no ex-
press and direct provision for their payment, where 
the contract expressly requires the contractor to 
pay such persons or to satisfy all claims for labor 
and materials." 
The same question is further annotated in 118 ·A. L. R. 
at page '57, and the rule at page 66 is stated to be that: 
"According to the majority view that laborers 
and materialmen may recover on a building con-
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tractor's bond conditioned for their payment, it is 
held by the weight of authority, as pointed out in 
the original annotation, that they are entitled to 
avail themselves of a bond conditioned merely for 
the faithful performance of a contract, where the 
contract expressly requires the contractor to pay 
such persons." 
Before considering the numerous cases cited in support 
of this rule, most of which are found in the two annotations, 
supra, we shall analyze briefly the 
Utah Decisions 
·Counsel for appellant relies upon certain of these cases. 
We shall consider them in the following order : 
Montgomery v. Spencer, 1'5- Utah 4195, .50 P. 623:, is a 
case in which materialmen supplying labor and material in 
the construction of the Utah Agricultural ·College brought 
suit against a personal surety. The court denied the right 
of the materialmen to proceed directly against the surety. 
The case can be distinguished from the case at bar on two 
grounds : First, the action is brought against a personal 
surety; and, second, the contract contains no promise on the 
part of the contractor to pay for labor performed or 
materials furnished. 
Smith v. Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 88 P. 6i8f7, like the 
Montgomery case, is an action brought by materialmen 
against the surety on construction growing out of the Utah 
Agricultural 'College buildings. ·The bond was conditioned 
for the protection of persons who might be entitled to file 
liens against the property. The court held that inasmuch as 
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the construction was a public building, no liens could be 
filed. ·Consequently no right of action existed against the 
surety. The case is distinguished from the one at bar be-
cause it is an action against a personal surety and the con-
ditions of the bond are limited in application. 
Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free et al., 46 Utah '233, 148 P. 427, 
is an action by a materialman against a contractor and a 
surety on a construction contract. This is .. a case of a com-
pensated surety. 'The bond in this case specifically pro-
vided that it should not cover or refer to any matter or thing 
relating to the contract and specifications except such 
clauses thereof as are recited in the bond made a part there-
of. 'The court in this case begins to depart from the early 
personal surety cases and intimates that a different rule 
may apply with respect to compensated sureties. The court, 
however, considered that it was bound by the limiting 
language of the bond and denied liability against the surety. 
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., supra, is 
an action by an owner against a. surety of a subcontractor, 
the subcontractor having installed defective elevators. The 
owner was ·held entitled to recover on the contract between 
the builder and the subcontractor and to sue the surety 
which conditioned its bond on the performance of such 
contract. The court makes a clear break from the doctrine 
announced in the early Utah suretyship cases and impliedly 
-overrules these cases at pages 486-7 in language as follows: 
"It is not necessary to review the former de-
cisions of the court referred to by counsel. If they 
are not in harmony with the last expression of the 
court, they are by implication overruled.'' 
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In Church v. Hartford, Ch~:ld & Co., 98 Utah 2:97, 9:5 P. 
(2d) 736, the court holds the surety liable in a suit by the 
owner but denies the right of a subcontractor to recover 
against the surety for consequential damage resulting from 
delay in performance. The court, however, at page 32:5 of 
the Utah report, is careful to point out that the subcon-
tractor is not in the position of a laborer or materialman 
so far as the Marble Company's contract is concerned in 
language as follows: 
"'Child & Company is not in the position of a 
laborer or materialman so far as the Marble 'C'om-
pany's contract is concerned. Hence, all the cases 
cited by Intervener on this portion of the case are· 
not in point." 
None of the above cited cases involved the construc-
tion of said statute, in fact each case, except the Church 
case, arose prior to its enactment. 
In our analysis of these decisions there is nothing in 
the expressions of this ~court in any compensated surety 
case to support the contentions made by appellant under 
its Point I. But, on the contrary, the fundamental prin-
ciples upon which this Court relies, particularly in the 
Walker Realty and Church cases, support the above stated 
general rule. This rule is abundantly supported by 
Decisions from Other Jurisdictions 
We believe it to be unnecessary to encumber this brief 
with quotations at length from the numerous cases which 
have considered the precise question here presented. 
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Topeka s·team Boiler Works Co., et al. v. U. S. Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co., 15 P. (2d) 416 (Kan.), is typical of the 
many such cases. The contract there provided that: 
"* * * Said party of the second part shall 
furnish all labor and material, equipment, fixtures, 
etc., necessary to construct, equip and install, and 
shall so construct, equip and install all * * *" 
(
1The work to be done is specified.) 
The general conditions made a part of the contract 
provided that: 
"* * * It is understood that the ~Contractor 
shall pay in full, all persons who perform labor and 
ninety percent (90%) of the cost of all material 
placed in the job, before submitting monthly esti-
mate and if called upon to do so at any· time hy the 
~Chief Engineer, the Contractor shall furnish proof 
that he has complied with the foregoing. Upon final 
settlement he shall furn'ish satisfactory evidence 
that all persons who have performed labor or furn-
ished material under his contract, have been fully 
paid, and in case such evidence is not furnished the 
~Chief Engineer shall have the right to cause to be 
retained any moneys due the ~contractor until all 
liabilities are fully discharged by paying them from 
such moneys as may be due him." 
The conditions of the bond were that: 
"* * * If the said principal shall faithfully 
perform or cause to be performed all of the terms 
and conditions, warranties and guarantees of said 
contract, and of the said specifications therein re-
ferred to in accordance with the true spirit and in-
tent of said contract, and shall do and perform each 
and every act on his part to be kept and performed 
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according to the terms and conditions of said con-
tract, then this obligation to be void, otherwise, to 
be and remain in full force and effect." 
The court in holding the materialmen entitled to recover 
on the bond of the surety announced the rule as follows : 
"* * * When, from the contract as a whole, 
it is clear that the contractor was to pay for material 
and labor necessary for the construction of the build-
ing, and a bond is given to secure· the faithful per-
formance of the contract, materialmen and laborers 
who have not been paid may sue directly upon the 
bond." 
The facts of the case and the rule are succinctly stated 
by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Forburger Stone Co. 
v. Lion Bonding & Surety Co., 170 N. W. 89·7, as follows: 
"A building contractor entered into a contract 
to construct a building, and gave a bond for the faith-
ful performance of the contract. This defendant was 
surety on the bond. The plaintiff furnished material 
to the contractor which was used in the construction 
of the building, and he brought this action against 
the surety on the bond to recover the value of the 
material. The bond required the contractor to per-
form all of the conditions of his contract, and one 
of the conditions of his contract was that he should 
pay for all the materials which he used in the build-
ing. ·Therefore this contractor's bond contained an 
agreement for the benefit of this plaintiff, and it has 
been frequently held by this court that, under such 
circumstances, a party for whose benefit the con-
tract was made can maintain an action directly 
against the party who has contracted for his benefit. 
Doll v. ·Crume, 41 Neb. 65-5, 59' N. W. 806, and cases 
cited. And various other decisions of this court are 
to this effect." 
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Other cases announcing substantially the same prin-
ciple are: 
Knight & J. Co. v. Castle (1909), 172 Ind. 97, 
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 5·73, 87 N. E. H7·6; 
National Surety Co. v. Rochester Bridge Co., 
(19215), 8'3 Ind. App. 195, 146 N. E. 415; 
Jordan v. Kavanaugh (1884), 6·3 Iowa 152, 18 
N. W. 851, infra (followed in Wells v. Kava-
naugh (1886), 70 Iowa 519, 30 N. W. 871); 
Algonite Stone Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity & D. Co. 
(1917), 100 Kan. 28, L. R. A. 19'17D, 722, 
163 Pac. 1076·; 
Cooke v. Luscombe (1931), 132 Kan. 147, 294 
~Pac. 84·9; 
Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. United States Gyp-
sum Co. (193~) 23.9 Ky. 247, 39'S. W. (2d) 
234; 
Orinoco· Supply Co. v. Shaw Bros. Lumber Co. 
(Orinoco Supply Co. v. Illinois Surety Go.) 
(1912.), 160 N. ·C. 42r8, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
707, 76 S. E. 273; 
Barringer v. Fidelity & D. Co. (1H31) 1159 18. E. 
•3713; 
Hollerman Mfg. Co. v. Standard Acci. Ins. Co. 
(19'3'1), 61 N. D. 6'37, 239 .N. W. 74'1; 
American Surety Co. v. Noe (193'2), 245 Ky. 42, 
5·3 s w. ('2d) 178; 
Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. Plank, 16~3 Va. 819, 
178 S. E. 58. 
We will not undertake in this brief to distinguish or 
analyze the cases from other jurisdictions cited by appel-
lant in support of its position on Point I other than to sug-
gest that in certain cases the contract may be fou.nd to con-
tain no promise by the contractor to pay laborers and mater-
ialmen. In others the bond may be conditioned upon the per-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
formance of some, though not of all, of the terms and con-
ditions of the contract. Some courts have been troubled 
with questions of privity where the owner was under no 
obligation to pay for materials or labor. No problem of this 
character arises in this jurisdiction because of the personal 
liability imposed upon the owner under the statute. In the 
final analysis, however, it must be said of any case found to 
be strictly in point and which denies the right of material-
men or laborers to recover upon the bond of the surety, 
that such case is contrary to the great weight of modern 
authority. 
Obligees under the Bond 
The point is made by appellant that the materialmen 
are not named as obligees in the bond. This is true. The 
question, however, is whether they need be so named. If 
the materialmen as a matter of law have a direct right of 
action against the surety, then, under the statute, it is im-
material whether or not they are named as obligees in the 
bond for the owner in affording such right of action has 
complied with the statute. We have concluded that the 
bond is conditioned for the prompt payment for all material 
furnished and labor performed under the contract. Having 
reached this conclusion, the right of action on the bond 
flows to the materialmen. The general rule to this effect 
is stated in 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction leon-
tracts, Sec. 95, as follows: 
"Although there are a few decisions to the con-
trary, the great weight of authority establishes the 
general rule that a person furnishing materials or 
labor may recover on a building contractor's bond 
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to the owner, where it contains a condition for his 
benefit and is intended for his protection, although 
the owner is the only obligee named in the bond, and 
there is no express provision that it shall inure to 
the benefit of laborers or materialmen or that they 
may avail themselves of the security thereof." 
This 1Court announces the same principle in Walker 
Realty Co. v. American Surety c·o., supra, at page 450 of 
the Utah report as follows: 
"* * * Whenever it appears from a contract 
that there is a clear intent to benefit a third party, 
whether specifically named in the contract or not, 
such person, ordinarily, may sue in his own name for 
the enforcement thereof or for the benefits arising 
therefrom. This general proposition, we believe, is 
well sustained by the great preponderance of judicial 
opinion in the several states of the Union." 
If there were any real doubt as to the right of the 
materialmen to sue upon the bond, even though they are 
not named as obligees therein, such doubt is removed by a 
consideration of the requirements of the statute. 1Title 17, 
U. C. A. 194.3, is in two chapters~ ·Chapter 1 requires the 
furnishing of a bond upon public contracts. Chapter 2. deals 
with such requirements on private contracts. The bond re-
quired of the owner under private construction is obviously 
a statutory bond. The rule of law is firmly established that 
when a statute requires a bond to be given and a bondsman 
undertakes to furnish it, the provisions of the statute are 
read into the terms of the bond and any of its text at 
variance with the statutory requisites is ignored. Of the 
many cases announcing this rule, particularly in point is 
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the recent case of Van ll' ert National Bank v. Roos, 17 N. 
E. (2d) 65~1 (Ohio). In that case, as in the case at bar, 
the bond contained no provision that it was conditioned 
upon payment of sums to laborers and materialmen, nor 
were they named as obligees therein. The Supreme ·Court 
of Ohio held this omission to be immaterial, saying in part: 
"A contractor's bond, given for the full and 
faithful performance of a contract for a public im-
provement, will be construed with reference to the 
statute pursuant to which it is given, and any pro-
vision omitted therefrom, which is required by stat-
ute to be included therein, will be read into the bond 
and deemed as fully a part thereof as if expressly 
therein written. This is so on the theory that the 
additional obligation required to be included in the 
bond was intended by the Legislature for the pro-
tection and benefit of laborers, materialmen and 
subcontractors, and that the contractor and surety, 
in giving the bond, intended to comply with the sta-
tutory provisions requiring such obligation. 
"'Consequently the bond herein questioned 
inures to the benefit of those who performed the 
labor and furnished material to the contractor in 
connection with the construction of the ditch im-
provement." 
The conclusion reached by the Ohio court is stated to be 
the general rule in 11 ·C. J. S., Bonds, p. 420. 
~c·onclusions on Point I. 
These propositions, then, appear to be established : The 
purpose of the statute was to require of an owner that he 
furnish a bond under which materialmen and laborers 
would enjoy a right of action against a surety, and in de-
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fault of so doing that he would become personally liable to 
them. The contract of the parties specifically requires the 
contractor not only to construct the building but also to pay 
materialmen and laborers. The bond, conditioned upon the 
faithful performance of the contract, is necessarily condi-
tioned upon the payment of the claims of the materialmen. 
The bond in question complies with the statute because it 
affords the prescribed remedy to the materialmen. It is im-
material that the materialmen are not named as obligees in 
the bond because they enjoy a right of action thereon as a 
matter of law. If there be any omission in the bond it will 
be read into the instrument and deemed as fully a part 
thereof as if expressly therein written. 
1The judgment of the trial court on Point I must there-
fore be affirmed. 
P'OINT II 
'The determination of the question presented under this 
point requires an examination of the pleadings. 
The surety filed a cross complaint against its codefend-
ant, the owner ( R. 377-382). Only the allegations under 
paragraph numbered 11 of the cross complaint need be con-
sidered in connection with Point II. In that paragraph the 
surety alleges that the owner violated the terms of the 
contract in that it failed to secure lien waivers and paid 
the contractor payments in excess of ninety per cent of the 
contract price prior to completion of the entire work, which 
acts of the owner were alleged to be to the prejudice and 
damage of the surety. The owner, in its answer to the cross 
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complaint, denies these allegations of damage and prejudice 
and thereby puts in issue these questions ( R. 62-64) . 
Appellant in its brief bases its claim for damage and 
prejudice upon said two allegations of its cross complaint. 
We are at a loss to understand the ground of appel-
lant's argument with respect to the lien waivers. The parties 
stipulated that no lien or claim of lien was filed by any 
person furnishing material or performing labor in connec-
tion with the construction under the contract (R. 348-350). 
The materialmen all waived their liens by failing to file. 
Appellant asserts that the only fair conclusion that can be 
drawn from the failure to require lien waivers is that the 
surety was thereby prejudiced. 
Appella~t does not define a lien waiver. We are there-
fore not informed as to the construction it seeks to place 
upon the term. We assume, however, that it has treated the 
term in its true meaning. A lien waiver is not a receipt or 
an acknowledgment of the payment of the debt, though a 
receipt may be incorporated into an instrument which con-
tains a waiver of lien. It may be that appellant fails. to 
distinguish between a lien waiver and a receipt or acknowl-
edgment of payment. A waiver is the giving up, relinquish-
ment, or surrender of some right. Missouri State Life Ins. 
Co. v. LeFevre, 10 'S. W. (2d) 267 (Texas). A lien waiver is 
precisely what the term implies-a surrendering or giving 
up of the right to charge property with a lien for the pay-
ment of a debt. Such right may effectively be surrendered 
by a failure to act, as well as a voluntary relinquishment. 
Appellant has not undertaken to point out how the position 
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of the surety is now different than it would have been had 
voluntary waivers been secured. Obviously no such show-
ing can be made, for the position of all parties, including 
materialmen, is now precisely the same as it would have 
been had instruments of waiver been obtained. We can see 
no merit whatever to the claim of the surety on this ground. 
Has the surety been damaged or prejudiced by any 
failure of the owner to retain from disbursements the per-
centage prescribed by the contract? The contract provides 
that: 
"The Owner shall make payments on account of 
the Contract as provided therein, as follows: 
"On or about the 1st and 15th day of each month 
90 per ·cent of the value, based on the Contract prices 
of labor and materials incorporated in the work, 
and of materials suitably stored at the site thereof 
up to the 1st and 15th day of that month, as estimated 
by the Architect, less the aggregate of prevous pay-
ments; and upon substantial completion of the entire 
work, a sum sufficient to increase the total payments 
to 90 per cent of the Contract price." 
From these provisions it is seen that the contract con-
templated that twice each month the architect would esti-
mate the value based on contract prices of material in-
corporated into the work and stored on the site and that 
payment should be made of ninety per cent of such value 
based upon the architect's estimates. 
Admittedly the owner and contractor did not follow 
this exact procedure. Payments were not made on the first 
and fifteenth days of each month, nor did the archi teet furn-
ish an estimate twice each month of the value of materials in-
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corporated in the work and stored on the site. The actual 
procedure was this: the owner made the first four payments 
to the contractor on the basis of the receipts and lien waivers 
attached to the respective checks. Thereafter, and commenc-
ing with the disbursement of August 17, 1946, the owner 
disbursed upon the certificates of the architect the precise 
amount certified by him in each case to be payable. It is con-
ceded that the architect's certificates do not show an esti-
mate of the value of the materials incorporated into the 
work, nor the value of the materials stored on the site, 
with a computation of ninety per cent of the total as the 
basis for the disbursement. He did, however, certify that, 
in accordance with the terms of the contract, there would 
be due and payable on the specified date the amount author-
ized by the certificate. To the certificates are attached re-
ceipts and, in some cases, lien waivers; further supporting 
the amount of each disbursement. In this way each dis-
bursement subsequent to August 17, 1946, and up to and 
including that of January 17, 1947, was handled. By the 
latter certificate, the architect certifies that the contract sum 
was then $32,176.00, on which there had been certified and 
paid $30,217.69, leaving $1,9~5.8.31 not yet certified. T'urn-
ing to the stipulation (R. 348), we find that a final extra 
of $230.00 was allowed for tile floor. This amount added 
to the $19~58.31 equals the sum of $21188.3~1 paid into- court. 
We are unable to follow the mathematical calculations 
by which counsel for appellant arrive at the conclusion that 
the owner made unauthorized payments to the contractor 
in the total sum of $110,211.70. This figure cannot be sup-
ported. In order to so demonstrate, we need not go through 
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each of the progress payments but only to look- to the total 
disbursed. Under the above quoted contract provisions, the 
owner was obligated on substantial completion of the entire 
work to have then paid the contractor ninety per cent of 
the contract price. The contract price, with additions 
and deductions, was $·32,406.00. The owner at the time 
of substantial completion, in strict performance of the 
contract, should have then paid the contractor an ag-
gregate amount equal to ninety per cent of the contract 
price, to-wit; $-29,16!5.4~0, and to have then retained 
$3240.60. Under the actual facts of this case, the building 
was substantially completed subsequent to the disbursement 
of January 17, 19'47, and prior to the payment into court of 
the sum of $2'188.3·~ on 1Septemb~r 20, 1947. At the time 
of such completion, the retention in the hands of the owner 
under the strict language of the contract should have been 
said sum of $3240.60. 'The owner actually held $2188.31. 
The difference of $:1 052.:29· constitutes the only amount 
which can be claimed as paid above the required retention. 
Assuming that the owner should under said contract 
provisions have had on hand $1052.29 more than it held at 
the time of substantial completion, does this prove that the 
surety has been damaged to this extent or at all? We think 
clearly not. Nowhere in the pleadings, the evidence, or 
in the argument in this case has the contention ever been 
made or is it now made by the surety that any of the funds 
paid by the owner to the contractor were misapplied or 
did not go into the construction. No attack was made upon 
the certificates of the architect or claim asserted that they 
are false in any particular. No suggestion has been ad-
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vanced that the owner or contractor did not proceed in the 
utmost good faith in their dealings under the contract or 
that the construction might have been carried forward 
otherwise than as advanced. 
The surety asserts that if the owner had retained more 
money the "kitty" would have held more funds for the pay-
ment of the claims of the materialmen. Obviously, if the 
owner had paid less, it would have held more, but would 
the actual position of the parties have been altered? An 
example will show that it would not. ·On January 17, 194,7, 
the architect certified a disbursement of $927.15. Appel-
lant contends that this disbursement was unauthorized. Had 
the owner retained these funds, and refused payment of 
the claims thereby discharged it would clearly have had 
more cash on hand, but the claims paid by disbursement 
of the $927.15 would have remained unsatisfied and would 
have been asserted in this proceeding and the actual position 
of the surety would remain unchanged. ·The same reasoning 
can be applied to any disbursement to demonstrate that a 
retention would have operated to increase cash on hand but 
also to increase the amount of the unpaid bills and would in 
no manner have improved the actual position of the parties. 
On the contrary, had the owner failed to make pay-
ments in the manner pursued by it, the surety might very 
well have suffered a much greater loss than actually 
sustained. A point not to be overlooked in this case is the 
fact that the contractor did complete the building. Had 
the owner at some phase of the construction held the con-
tractor strictly to the terms of the retention provisions and 
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deprived him of the ability to then discharge some item for 
labor or materials, it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
the ability of the contractor to go forward might have been 
impaired. As the matter worked out, the completion of the 
building by the contractor unquestionably operated to min-
imize the loss. 
S.imply stated, this is a case in which a contractor un-
dertook in September, 1945, to complete within ninety days 
a building which was not fully completed for approximately 
two years. The actual cost of the building exceeded the 
contract price of $3:2·,406.00 by an amount equal to not less 
than the sum of the claims for which the materialmen re-
covered j udgm.ent. The contractor went broke on the job 
and there were insufficient funds in the contract to pay the 
costs of construction. Nothing which the owner did or failed 
to do adversely affected the position of the surety in the 
matter. 
Appellant in effect asks this ·Court to hold, as a matter 
of law, that a failure on the part of the owner to comply 
with the retention provisions of the contract releases the 
surety at least to the extent of the unwithheld percentage. 
Reliance is placed on Paxton v. Spencer, 71 Utah 313, 265 
P. 7:511. This case was reviewed and further considered in 
Church v. Hart ford,. Child & Co., supra. In the latter case 
this Court at page 309~ of the Utah report observes that: 
"* * * But the trend of the later well-con-
sidered cases where compensated surety companies 
are involved is toward releasing the surety only to 
the extent of his prejudice." 
and announces the rule to be 
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"* * * As applied in this case, we hold that 
failure to retain the 10% and payment of vouchers on 
all marble instead of delivered marble only, did not 
release the surety entirely but only to the· extent 
that it was prejudiced thereby. 
In commenting on Paxton v. Sp.encer, the court ob-
serves: 
''Paxton v. Spencer * * * seems, partially 
contrary. to this holding, since in that case we held 
that failure to retain the 10%, although not releas-
ing the surety completely, did release it to the extent 
of the 10%. But in that case the court found damage 
to the surety in the failure to retain the 10%. 
* * * * * 
"But if Paxton v. Spencer, supra, meant to hold 
that in all cases as a matter of law the surety was 
damaged by failure to retain the 10% even though 
it was necessarily and reasonably expended on the 
contract, we think the decision failed to follow 
through and is against the weight of authority and 
the actualities of the situation." 
Burden of Proof 
As here shown, the issue of damage and prejudice arises 
in this case from the allegations of the surety in its cross 
complaint and the denial of the owner in its answer thereto. 
The proof of damage and prejudice is part of the surety's 
cause of action. The burden of such proof rests upon it. 'The 
cases so hold. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Eagle River U. F. H. 
School Dist. et al., 205 N. W. 92.6, is typical of many such 
authorities. 'There the court recites certain of the facts 
and states the ·rule as follows: 
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faith sought. to work out the situation, and to make 
it possible for the contractor to complete the work. 
This might or might not have resulted to the benefit 
of the surety, but it by no means appears in this case 
that the surety suffered any damage by reason of this 
conduct, and by failing to show that it was damaged 
it has failed to prove a cause of ·action, or that it 
was released from the obligations which it had vol-
untarily assumed." 
To the same effect are : 
Board of County Commissioners v. U. S. F. & G., 
150 P. 590; 
National Surety Co. v. Haley, 159, P. 2:92; and this court 
In Church v. Hartford, Child & Co., supra, at pages 308 
and 309 of the Utah report makes reference to the same rule. 
Conclusions on Point II 
There is no substance to the claim of the surety that it 
was damaged by the failure of the owner to procure lien 
waivers. The failure of the owner in any respect to comply 
with the provisions of the contract relating to retention 
of percentage in the disbursement of funds to the contractor 
in no way damaged or prejudiced the surety. The rule pre-
vails in this jurisdiction that a surety is released by the 
failure of the owner to retain stipulated percentages pre-
scribed in a contract only to the extent of the surety's dam-
age or prejudice. The burden of proof on the issue of dam-
age or prejudice rested upon the surety in this case and was 
in no manner discharged by it. 
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The trial court properly applied the controlling law to 
the facts presented under the cross complaint of the surety 
against the owner, and its judgment should be affirmed. 
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